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ESSAY
MCDONALD’S OTHER RIGHT
Professor Samuel Wiseman*

A

INTRODUCTION

S is widely known, in June 2010 the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, holding that the Due Pro-‐
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second
Amendment binding on the states.1 The strong public and scholarly
interest in the case is due, in large part, to the controversial nature
of the right that was incorporated, but also to excitement (at least
among scholars) over the first incorporation in roughly forty years.2
Despite this broad interest, one feature of McDonald appears to have
gone so far unnoticed:3 the right to keep and bear arms is not the
sole provision of the Bill of Rights that the opinion incorporates, for
* The author is an Assistant Professor at the University of Tulsa College of Law. He
received his J.D. from Yale Law School and his B.A. from Yale University.
1 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
2 The last incorporation case was Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), which ap-‐
plied the prohibition against double jeopardy to the states. Id. at 794.
3 This incorporation remains unnoticed even by those who have written about
McDonald. See, e.g., Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet: McDonald v. City of Chicago and the
Limits of Progressive Originalism, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 369, 380–81 (2010) (stat-‐
ing that “the Court has yet to analyze only two (relatively insignificant) individual
rights found in the Bill of Rights for the purposes of incorporation: the Third Amend-‐
ment prohibition on the quartering of soldiers in private homes and the Eighth
Amendment right against excessive bails and fines”); Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Hector R.
Lozada, A Nomination of a Supreme Court Justice: The Incorporation Doctrine Revisit-‐
ed, 35 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 365, 382–83 (2010) (stating that “the Court has yet to rule on
the applicability of the Eighth Amendment’s bar on ‘[e]xcessive bail’ to the states”).
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the first time, against the states. This oversight is understandable,
however, because while the incorporation of the Second Amend-‐
ment prompted over two hundred pages of opinions, the incorpora-‐
tion of the second provision, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, required only a footnote.
I. THE INCORPORATION OF THE EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSE
To be fair, scholars’ oversight with respect to Eighth Amendment
incorporation is also understandable because the distinction being
drawn here is a fine one. Whereas previously the Court had gone no
further with respect to the Excessive Bail Clause than to say that it
had “been assumed” to apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,4 McDonald—citing a case in which neither party had
even raised an Eighth Amendment issue—unequivocally places the
prohibition against excessive bail among the incorporated rights ra-‐
ther than among those still in constitutional limbo.5 If there is any
meaningful difference between these statuses—and most,6 though
4 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (finding that “the Eighth Amendment’s
proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also Browning-‐Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Dis-‐
posal, 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971)) (“In addition, the Court has assumed
that the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to the States.”); Baker
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (“We of course agree with the dissent’s quota-‐
tion of the statement from [Schilb] that ‘the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of exces-‐
sive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.’”); Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 659 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Nei-‐
ther the Supreme Court nor we have held that the Clause is incorporated against the
states.”); cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). In discussing cruel and unusual
punishment in 2008, the Court in Kennedy found that the entire Eighth Amendment ap-‐
plied to the states, finding, “The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’” Id. at 419. This
appears to have been judicial sloppiness rather than an accurate statement of the law,
however, because just under two decades earlier, the Court in Browning-‐Ferris stated
that it had never determined whether the excessive fines portion of the Eighth
Amendment applied to the states and specifically declined to decide whether it did. See
Browning-‐Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262–64. The McDonald court confirms this, recognizing the
Court’s previous failure to decide the incorporation issue for excessive fines in Brown-‐
ing-‐Ferris. 130 S. Ct. at 3035, n.13.
5 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034–35, nn.12–13 (citing Schilb, 404 U.S. at 365). This is
dicta, certainly, but dicta from which return seems extremely unlikely.
6 See Joshua Dressler & George C. Thomas, Dressler & Thomas’ Criminal Procedure:
Principles, Policies, and Perspectives 793 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that incorporation of
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certainly not all7 scholars appear to have thought that there was—
then, after pausing to solemnly mark the explicit guarantee of an-‐
the right remains in question); Stephen G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights
Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868:
What Rights are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 7,
82 (2008) (“It can be argued that the Supreme Court signaled its willingness to incor-‐
porate this right against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1971, alt-‐
hough it has not technically done so thus far.”) (emphasis added); Mary M. Cheh, Consti-‐
tutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-‐Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J.
1325, 1383 n.298 (1991) (observing that “the Court has assumed that the excessive
bail clause of the same amendment also applies to the states”); Nancy J. King, Portion-‐
ing Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 101, 155, n.155 (1995) (noting that the Bail Clause “has been assumed” to apply
to the states and citing Schilb); Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous:
The Eight Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment as applicable to the states has occurred indi-‐
rectly, if at all”); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31
Ga. L. Rev. 1, 49 n.112 (1996) (describing Schilb as “apparently assuming that [the] Ex-‐
cessive Bail Clause is incorporated”); Jeremy M. Miller, The Potential for an Equal Pro-‐
tection Revolution, 25 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 287, 294 (2006) (explaining that “[t]hose
guarantees of the Bill of Rights still not enforced against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment are the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the Fifth Amendment right
to an indictment by a grand jury, the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause, [and]
the Eighth Amendment bail clause”); Peter Preiser, Rediscovering a Coherent Rationale
for Substantive Due Process, 87 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 19, n.122 (2003) (stating that “[t]he
Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive bail and excessive fines has never been
addressed as a due process concern”); cf. Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining:
Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1457, 1524 (2000)
(“With regard to excessive bail and excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment, it
seems hard to believe that the Court would not incorporate those rights if ever con-‐
fronted with the issue, especially given that the remaining Eighth Amendment guaran-‐
tee, against cruel and unusual punishments, has long been incorporated. The Court has,
in fact, expressed in dicta an assumption that the Excessive Bail Clause applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
7 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 545–46 (3d. ed. 2009) (briefly list-‐
ing the unincorporated rights, and not including the Excessive Bail Clause); Akhil Reed
Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1221, 1230 & n.33 (2002) (not
including the Excessive Bail Clause among the list of the “only major exceptions” to in-‐
corporation); Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response to
William P. Gray, Jr., 49 Ala. L. Rev. 551, 569 n.80 (1998) (listing excessive bail as appli-‐
cable to the states and citing Schilb); Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism
and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483, 549–50 (1997) (stating that
“the Warren Court incorporated against the states every right of the criminally accused
contained in the Bill of Rights except the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of a grand
jury indictment”); Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America,
52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 471, 479 (2001) (stating that “the Court made . . . the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from excessive bail applicable to the states”); Christopher J.
Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1454, 1524, n.285
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other of our constitutional liberties against infringement by state
and local governments, it remains to wonder how the Court could
have been so cavalier.
II. EXPLANATIONS
A. A Quiet End to Years of Presumed Incorporation
Part of the answer to the footnote puzzle, of course, must surely
be that after years of assuming it to be the case, the Court felt it so
obvious that the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Excessive Bail
Clause to the states that it was unnecessary to wait for the issue to
be presented. Such a feeling would be understandable: employing
the standards reaffirmed in McDonald, the issue seems nearly free
from doubt. If “the presumption of innocence, secured only after
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning” unless the “right to
bail before trial is preserved,”8 then the prohibition against exces-‐
sive bail would certainly seem to be “fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty and system of justice,” and “deeply rooted in this Na-‐
tion’s history and tradition.”9 A skeptic might question whether a
right that only forty-‐two percent of felony defendants are able to ex-‐
ercise10 can truly be fundamental, but if more proof were needed,
then the fact that “[a]ll thirty-‐seven state constitutions in 1868—
every last one—provided that excessive bail shall not be required in
criminal cases” should suffice.11
B. A Matter of Indifference
Another, less happy part of the explanation of the McDonald
Court’s incorporation-‐by-‐footnote, though, may be that the issue
largely escaped the Court’s attention because the Excessive Bail
Clause, as interpreted by the Court, has so little force that it simply
(2000) (describing Schilb as “incorporating Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessive
bail”).
8 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
9 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034, 3036.
10 Thomas Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Felony Defend-‐
ants in Large Urban Counties 7 (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf.
11 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 6, at 81.
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does not matter very much whether it applies to the states or not.
Even for the Bill of Rights, the Clause is a model of succinct ambigui-‐
ty. As Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire said in
the congressional debate over the Bill of Rights, “The clause seems
to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no ob-‐
jection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it
necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be
the judges?”12 Livermore, of course, did not carry the day; it fell to
the courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to provide answers to
these very basic questions: how are we to determine what amount
of bail is “excessive” (or appropriate) for a particular defendant?
With reference to what principles or objectives?
On one hand, the Clause could be read as a check on both the judi-‐
ciary and the legislature, guaranteeing that bail will not be excessive
in light of some implicit conception of the legitimate uses of pretrial
detention—perhaps only in capital cases,13 or when necessary to the
functioning of the judicial process.14 On the other hand, the Clause
may also be read as leaving the legislature free to determine wheth-‐
er and under what circumstances bail should be allowed. Under
such a construction, the Clause serves only to prevent judges from
setting bail higher than necessary to achieve whatever goal the leg-‐
islature has sought to achieve.15
The Supreme Court largely resolved these questions in 1987 in
United States v. Salerno, when it considered a facial challenge to the
provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 allowing detention for

12 1 Annals of Cong. 754 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., Washington, 1834), re-‐
printed in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 377 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987), quoted in Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of
1984: The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36
Fordham Urb. L.J. 121, 128 (2009).
13 Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 989
(1965). For a fuller discussion of these scholars’ views, see Wiseman, supra note 12, at
135–36 and accompanying footnotes; see also infra notes 13 through 15 and accompa-‐
nying text.
14 See Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of
John Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371, 404 (1970).
15 William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 Alb. L. Rev. 33, 86
(1977); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952); Hermine H. Meyer,
Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 Geo. L.J. 1139, 1179 (1972); John N. Mitchell,
Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1223, 1225
(1969).
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dangerousness.16 The Court, after a brief textual and historical anal-‐
ysis, declined to decide whether the Eighth Amendment puts any
limit on “Congress’ power to define the classes of criminal arrestees
who shall be admitted to bail,” but concluded that “[t]he only argua-‐
ble substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s
proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in
light of the perceived evil.”17 It then held that “when Congress has
mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest” such as
preventing crime by arrestees, “the Eighth Amendment does not re-‐
quire release on bail.”18 While it may be an overstatement to say that
the Court’s interpretation has left the Excessive Bail Clause “below
the level of a pious admonition,”19 it is not merely coincidental that
it remains “one of the least litigated provisions in the Bill of
Rights.”20
With respect to challenges to legislative restrictions on pretrial
release (assuming they exist), the goal blessed by Salerno—ensuring
the safety of the community (including, perhaps, safety from eco-‐
nomic harm)21—is broad enough by itself to allow detention for
most felonies. After all, if the government’s interest in averting dan-‐
ger can help justify imprisoning the convicted for years,22 it would
seem, in most cases, to justify detaining the presumptively innocent.
Put another way, it is difficult to put a value—whether measured in
dollars or in days of pretrial detention—on the prevention of crime,
and courts seem unlikely to second-‐guess a legislature on such a cal-‐
culation except in extremely unusual cases. Nor does the Eighth
Amendment appear to impose many limits on how dangerousness is
determined: under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, judges must consid-‐
er a wide range of factors when determining whether to detain a de-‐
fendant pretrial, including, among others, “the person’s character,
physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial re-‐
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Id. at 754.
18 Id. at 754–55.
19 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 556 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
20 Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 659 (9th Cir. 2007).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Madoff, 316 F. App’x 58, 59–60 (2nd Cir. 2009); United
States v. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192–93 (9th Cir. 1992) (order).
22 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (affirming, under a proportionality
analysis, a sentence to twenty-‐five years in prison for stealing golf clubs because the
crime was a third offense).
16
17
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sources, length of residence in the community, community ties,” and
“the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release.”23 And
while the Bail Clause may still prevent individual judges from im-‐
posing conditions greater than necessary to accomplish the legisla-‐
ture’s goal, normal avenues of appellate review already serve this
purpose. Thus, as things stand, the Excessive Bail Clause protects
the accused-‐but-‐not-‐yet-‐convicted from only the most extreme leg-‐
islatures and courts, and the most careless.24
CONCLUSION
Given the relative lack of controversy surrounding the Excessive
Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, even the most optimistic of
bail scholars would not have expected the Supreme Court to pro-‐
duce two hundred pages of opinion when the issue of its incorpora-‐
tion was settled. But even Eeyore would have confidently predicted
the question would receive a paragraph or two—in a case actually
presenting the question. The fact that it did not tells us much about
its present status.

Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2010).
For a careless legislative action struck down by a court under the Bail Clause, see
United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 601 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that release
restrictions on sex offenders violate Excessive Bail Clause when the restrictions are
specifically mandated—including a mandate when the restrictions are unnecessary to
protect the community).
23
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